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Domestic Partnership: Missing the Target?
Margaret F. Brinig*
When I think of all the worries people seem to find
And how they're in a hurry to complicate their mind
By chasing after money and dreams that can't come true
I'm glad that we are different, we've better things to do
May others plan their future, I'm busy lovin' you....
The Grass Roots, Let's Live For Today, on Let's Live
for Today (MCA Records 1967)
Chapter 6, Domestic Partnerships, like many other parts' of the ALI
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, functions as a set of default rules.2
Under the ALI Principles for domestic partnerships, therefore, if the parties meet
state presumptive requirements for domestic partnerships and have not otherwise
contracted, the rules of Chapter 6 apply.' Usually, law sets default provisions to
"Thanks to all the participants in the BYU symposium for their help, and especially to Steven Nock and
Mark Strasser.
SManysections of the PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS [hereinafter ALl PRINCIPLES] have language that allows waiver by agreement between the parties (under
Chapter 7). Chapter 2 on Child Custody, for example, specifically notes that its "replication" principle applies
only when the parties are not otherwise able to reach agreement. Section § 2.09 (1) begins "Unless otherwise
resolved by agreement of the parents under § 2.07..." (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part 1, 1998).
2Default rules are common in contractual settings. In law and economics jargon, they at least theoretically
provide for what most parties would have agreed to under the given circumstances. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989);
Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REv. 489
(1989); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100
YALE L.J. 615 (1990); J.P. Kostritsky, "Why Infer "? What the New Institutional Economics Has to Say About
Law-Supplied Default Rules, 73 TUL. L. REv. 497 (1998); Russell Korobkin, Inertia andPreference in Contract
Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1583 (1998);
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 608 (1998); Morten
Hviid, Default Rules and Equilibrium Selection of Contract Terms, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 233 (1996). Even
more relevant to this paper, fiduciary duties can be seen as default rules. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary
Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REv. 1209 (1995) (corporations); Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz,
Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REv. 1627 (1999) (discussing elected officials and election law);
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REv. 1225, 1250-51 (1998)
(marriage).
' Requiring parties to contract around default rules is strong medicine indeed, if the default principles
trigger effects that occur at times when people are not already contracting. If the default rules are applied to
commercial contracts (see, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) § 1-102 (3) ("The effect of provisions of
this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided in this Act .. "), and they reflect what most
people would rationally choose otherwise, I have no problem. Accord, Steven L. Burton, Default Principles,
Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. INrERDISC. L.J. 115 (1993).
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1) what most parties would want;4 or2) to what will promote efficiency.' I will
dis-cuss these two concepts in turn, illustrating how the ALI domestic partner-
ships provisions satisfy neither ex ante hypothetical bargaining nor efficiency
criteria, and thus that Chapter 6, which purports to set default rules, 6 breaks from
this usual pattern. In fact, instead of doing what most parties would want or what
is good for broader society, Chapter 6 both over- and undershoots its target.
Apparently (according to the Comments for Chapter 6), the ALI wanted to
protect same-sex couples7 and some who would otherwise fall between the
cracks-putative spouses,' victims of fraud and deceit,9 and those who are not
legally married but should be estopped from claiming otherwise." Others in this
conference" are discussing Chapter 6 as it applies to same-sex partners, so I will
concentrate here on heterosexual couples.
For heterosexual couples, who will be the vast majority of those affected, 2
being treated between themselves as though they were married, which is what the
Principles do, probably isn't what they want. Most heterosexual cohabiting
See sources cited supra note 2.
Promotion of efficient outcomes, as opposed to what the parties most often want, is the other
justification commonly given for default rules. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the
Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389 (1993) (discussing various kinds of efficiency-producing
norms); cf. Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1820
(1998) ("Commercial law instead provides parties with default rules that, at least in theory, direct the ex ante
efficient result in standard cases.").
6 Comment to § 6.02, of the ALl PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4 (2000)), at 13:
The Chapter does not impose all the consequences of recognition as domestic partners on
every couple that falls within its definition, because couples may, by agreement, avoid the rules
that this Chapter would otherwise apply .... Some may thus understand this Chapter as a set of
default rules that apply to domestic partners who do not provide explicitly for a different set of
rules. One can see the default rules as, in effect, a contract imposed by law on parties who do not
set forth their agreement to some different set of rules.
7 Section 6.01(1) provides in part that "Domestic partners are two persons of the same or opposite sex,
not married to one another .. "
8 See Comments to § 6.01(d), at 7, discussing the difference between the traditional putative spouse
doctrine and the ALI PRINCIPLES. See also Reporter's Notes to Comment d. Id. at 9.
9 See, e.g., Alexander v. Kuykendall, 63 S.E.2d 746 (195 1) (damages in fraud and deceit granted to
"wife" whose "husband" secretly remained married to another).
"0 See, e.g., Poor v. Poor,409 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. 1980) ("husband" who knew of conditions of wife's
extraterritorial divorce equitably estopped from claiming that his subsequent marriage to her was invalid);
Psaurodis v. Psaurodis, 261 N.E.2d 108 (N.Y. 1970) (where "husband" did not disclaim marriage in separate
maintenance proceeding, he was collaterally estopped from doing so at divorce).
I See, e.g., Mark Strasser,A Small Step Forward: TheALI's Domestic Partners Provision; Terry Kogan,
Chapter 6, Domestic Partners-Favorable Perspectives and Criticism; and David Orgon Coolidge, Global
Domestic Partnership Issues. For an economic analysis, see Robert Rowthom, Marriage as a Signal, section
4, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (Robert Rowthorn & Antony Dnes, eds.,
forthcoming, 2001).
2 Estimates of the number of same-sex couples vary, but the low and high estimates seem tobe between
two and ten percent of the population. The CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY of March, 1998, Table 8, at 71
(1998), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/-socdemo/ms-la.html, shows 1,674,000 same-sex
cohabiting couples compared to 4,236,000 heterosexual unmarried couples and 54,317,000 married couples
(Table C, at v).
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couples fall into one of two groups. They may be on their way to marriage," in
which case the abolition of heartbalm actions 4 by legislatures and at common law
suggests a public policy to treat them differently from married persons. 5
Another set of couples affirmatively wishes to reject marriage, 16 as Chapter
6 recognizes. 1 The Comments to the Principles note that Chapter 6 "diminishes
the effectiveness of [the] strategy" 8 of avoiding responsibility. To the extent that
the goal of Chapters 3 and 4 (Compensatory Payments and Property Division) is
3 See, e.g., Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, National Estimates of Cohabitation, 26 DEMOGRAPHY
615 (1989) ("There is no single answer to whether cohabitation is a late stage of courtship or an early stage of
marriage. It is the former for couples who are uncertain about their relationship but are considering marriage,
the latter for those who would marry immediately were it not for some practical constraint, and neither for
couples who do not want to marry each other.")
" For a review, see Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 203 (1990). Heartbalm
actions, typically involving engaged couples, were breach of marriage promise and seduction. For a recent case
discussion, see Miller v. Ratner, 688 A.2d 976 (Md. Ct. App. 1997).
"5 See also the considerations and cases cited in Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love:
Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1996) (stating that contracts for household services are not
enforced when couples are married). Contracts in which sexual services predominate are not enforced because
akin to prosecution. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1208 (I11. 1979) (citing 6A CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1476 (1962) and RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, §§ 589, 597 (1932)).
6 Thus in a forthcoming review of MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY (2000), Nicholas Bala, Faculty of Law, Queen's University, Kingston,
Ontario, argues:
The motivations for living together outside of marriage are complex, but these relationships
frequently arise because one party (often the man) is unwilling to make the commitment of
marriage and does not want to undertake the legal obligations of marriage. If the period of
cohabitation is short, it may be quite fair to have no obligations arise from the relationship.
However, if the relationship is longer term, the expectations of the parties may change over time,
even if they do not marry. One partner, most commonly the woman, may "invest" more in the
relationship and any children.
Nicholas Bala, 2 isuma(2) I (Summer 2001).
"7 Comment to ALI PRINCIPLES § 6.02, at 14 seems to recognize this possibility by noting: "On the
contrary, to the extent that some individuals avoid marriage in order to avoid responsibilities to a partner..."
8 Id. Provisions even broader than the ALIPRINCIPLES have been legislated in Canada for both same-sex
and heterosexual couples. The Canadian Supreme Court in M. v. H., 2 S.C.R. 3 (1999), held that benefits
granted to heterosexual cohabitants under the definition of"spouse" under the Family Law Act § 29, granting
benefits to separating cohabitants who have lived together at least three years or who have a common child and
have lived together in a relationship of some permanence, must be extended to same-sex couples as a matter of
equality. In the legislation passed last August, C-23, the definition of "common law partner" for purpose of
numerous federal benefits and obligations includes those in a conjugal relationship for one year or more. The
CANADIAN CRIMINAL CODE § 215(l)(b) punishes those who do not fumish necessaries to the common law
partner. P.S.C., Ch. 46, § 215(l)(b) (2000) (Can.). The application of the benefits and obligations of domestic
partnership law to ongoing relationships is a major difference from Chapter 6 of the ALIPRINCIPLES, which does
not impose a support obligation while the relationship continues. This is also a difference between Chapter 6
and Vermont's Civil Union status. See Coolidge, supra note 11, Bala, supra note 16, and implicitly the ALI,
supra note 17 (implying that by imposing duties on separating cohabiting couples, men will not be discouraged
from marrying). But they may miss the powerful evidence that men benefit powerfully from marriage, not
cohabitation. See generally STEVEN L. NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN'S LIVES (1999). LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE
GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETrER OFF
FINANCIALLY (2000).
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to encourage specialization between spouses and investment in the family,19
applying the same principles to dissolving domestic partnerships flies in the face
of reality because "cohabiting couples are less specialized than married couples,
are less interdependent, and have far more embedded equality goals."2 They are
in the "Live for Today" world of the song with which we began. They thus fail
to satisfy the efficiency, or normative, criteria. To understand why, consider what
efficiency means in the context of families, as opposed to commercial settings.
For families, I would argue that the usual economic limitations of efficiency
are too narrow. In my view, couple relationships seem most "efficient" when they
produce intimacy,2' and parenting relationships are most "efficient" when they
allow children to flourish. 2 How does a family develop this efficiency? To get
to the "efficient" or in my view "covenantal" relationship, you first need
permanence23 or at least a very long time horizon. In game theory terms, this
would be translated to an indefinite termination repeated game. 4 Why does this
come first? Because without some idea that the relationship will last forever, or
at least for a very long time, you will not get the second necessary ingredient,
unconditional love.25 When you think the relationship will end, both you and your
partner have incentives to maximize short-run gain,26 or at least play "tit for tat."2 7
'
9 The proper goals for alimony are discussed in a large number of articles. Perhaps the best known is by
the Reporter for the ALl PRINCIPLES. Ira Mark Eliman, The Theory ofAlimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989). See
also, June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and
Divorce Reform, 65 TuL. L. REV.953 (1991); June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of
Alimony: A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463 (1990); Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The
Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic JustificationforAlimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423, 2451-2453 (1994).
The economic justifications for alimony can be found in the somewhat technical Elisabeth M. Landes,
Economics ofAlimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD.35 (1978).
20 For a thorough empirical discussion of these points, see Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages
and Cohabitating Relationships, 16 J. FAM. ISSUES 53 (1995).21 Accord, MILTON C. REGAN, FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1993).
22 See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
THE FAMILY 18 (2000). See also Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV.
2401, 2416, 2476 (1995).
23 See BRINIG, supra note 22, at 6-7.
24 See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 8-9 (1984); THOMAS C. SCHELLING,
THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 5 (1960); Alvin E. Roth & Francoise Schoumaker, Expectations and Reputations
in Bargaining: An Experimental Study, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 362, 371 (June 1983).
25 For lengthier musings about unconditional love, see BRINIG, supra note 22, at 11, 14, 83-84.
26 In game theory terms, this is called the Prisoner's Dilemma. These games are described in Jack
Hirshleifer, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 518-19 (2d ed. 1988). The idea is that two prisoners accused
of a common crime are separated and then questioned. Each is told that if he confesses, he will get a reduced
punishment. If neither confesses, both will go free because there will not be enough evidence. The theory is that
they will both confess if they cannot communicate, because for each that is the lowest risk strategy. For
applications to family law, see, e.g., Antony W. Dnes, Applications of Economic Analysis to Marital Law:
Concerning A Proposal to Reform the Discretionary Approach to the Division of Marital Assets in England
And Wales, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 533 (1999); Scott & Scott, supra note 2, at 1278 n. 113, 1294; Milton
C. Regan, Market Discourse and Moral Neutrality, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 605, 646. For children, see Paula
England & Nancy Folbre, Who Should Pay for the Kids? 563 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 194 (1999).
27 This term comes from AXELROD, supra note 24.
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In other words, you are in the world of contract, the "exchange relationship."28
For reasons I hope to demonstrate shortly, the exchange relationship is distinctly
not the world of families that law ought to be interested in protecting.
On the other hand, assume now that we have the first two ingredients:
permanence, which encourages the second, unconditional love. At this point, we
have what "looks like" a family: people who are committed to each other over the
very long time horizon and who are giving to each other without an expectation
of immediate return or perhaps any return.29 In Steven Nock's terminology,3 ° they
are living in the past and future, in a world of debts and futures, rather than the
present.31 At this point, society (the community, meaning the religious commu-
nity, the state, and even extended families) will act to support the family.32 There
will be laws promoting families, 33 giving constitutional rights,34 and protecting
the entity from outside assault.35 There will be benefits that flow from being in
such a family,36 and obligations that "are the threads from which intimacy is
woven." 37 The members of the family live in covenant.
Policy makers are unlikely to want to provide default rules for cohabitation
that would encourage cohabitation,38 since empirical studies show it is far less
stable than marriage.39 (See Tables 1 and 2). Further, the partners invest less in
28 For a fuller explanation, see Gary L. Hansen, Moral Reasoning and the Marital Exchange
Relationship, 131 J. SOC. PSYCH. 71 (1991).
29 As Steven Nock puts it, "cohabiting couples are less specialized than married couples, are less
interdependent, and have far more embedded equality goals," Nock, supra note 20, at X.
"o Steven L. Nock, Turn-Taking as Rational Behavior, 27 SOC. SC. RES. 235, 243 (1999).
31 Id. at 239-41 (1998) (Certain behavior in marriage only makes sense if its turn-taking nature is
considered; marriages exist not only in the present, but more vividly in their "histories and futures").
32 See Margaret F. Brinig, Troxel and the Limits of Community, available at http://www.uiowa.edu/-
-mfblaw.
3 For a description of those available to married couples, see Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No Mar-
riage, 16 QUrNNIPIAC L. REv. 27 (1996).
31 One of the latest pronouncements of a parental right to autonomy came in Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.
Ct. 2054 (2000).
3' For example, consider the household exemption from bankruptcy and the "family estate" or tenancy
by the entirety that shields marital property from creditors.
36 For a "nonexclusive" list of such benefits, see the Vermont Civil Union Legislation, 2000 Vermont
Laws P.A. 91 (H. 847), Section 1204(e) (listing twenty-four such benefits).
3' Nock, supra note 30.
38 The Comments to ALl PRINCIPLES § 6.02, at 14 (2000), note that "[i]t is not an objective (or a likely
effect) of this Chapter to encourage parties to enter a nonmarital relationship as an alternative to marriage." A
good and contemporary survey of the signaling effects of marriage versus cohabitation (including results of
numerous international studies) appears in Rowthom, supra note 11. Encouragement could also come from the
"channeling function" law provides. Thus the distinction between cohabitation, which society disfavors, could
channel couples into marriage, the more favored institution. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling
Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 495, 520-21 (1992) (discussing Marvin v. Marvin).
39 Larry L. Bumpass, et al., The Role of Cohabitation in Declining Rates of Marriage, 53 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 913 (1991). See also Bumpass & Sweet, supra note 13, at 620-21 (stating that "most cohabiting
couples either marry or stop living together within a few years; two fifths... do not continue as cohabi[tants]
for more than one year, only one-third last 2 years, and only 1 in 10 are still cohabiting after 5 years," with the
median duration of 1.3 years.) See generally PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES:
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each other or in the relationship4° than they do if married.41 In other words,
cohabitation does not promote "economic efficiency" in the same way marriage
does.42 For example, when men marry, they do much better financially than if
single or cohabiting,43 presumably either because their wives "nag" them into
more responsible behavior,44 or because women contribute "backup" support that
makes men's labor force participation more focused.45 Cohabitants are more
likely than married couples to share household tasks relatively equally and to
generally value gender equality."
The following provides some evidence of how equal sharing does not
necessarily promote stability in marriage. This study47 includes married couples
in their first marriages" who are reporting on whether or not they see the sharing
MONEY, WORK, SEX 594 Table 3 (showing cohabitating relationships lasting a median of 1.7 years) (1983).
Even a casual look at marriage statistics shows they are far more stable. First, more than 50% of all marriages,
even those contracted after 1980, endure until one of the parties dies. Second, even for the minority that end in
divorce, the average length of marriage is about seven years. See, e.g., Douglas W. Allen & Margaret Brinig,
Sex, Property Rights, and Divorce, 5 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 211 (1998).
40 The mechanism for making these investments through marriage and enforcing them at divorce is
discussed in Carbone & Brinig, supra note 19, at 959.
4' Nock, supra note 20, at X.
42See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1820 (Default Rule); cf Schwartz, supra note 5 (Contract Theory
Approach).
43 See, e.g., VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 58-60 (1988) (comparing
economic situation of married women and men with that of unmarried women and men). See also NOCK, supra
note 18, at 66, 143 (showing the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth: 1979-93, and showing that the same
married men earn $4,260.85 more than before they were married, holding age constant).
"The virtues of nagging are discussed in WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 18, at 55-57; see also Linda
J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 496 (1995) (noting that such assistance and advice
results in 'freeing husbands' for work.").
4' For an argument that these contributions justify a share in earning capacity upon divorce, see Margaret
F. Brinig, Property Distribution Physics: The Talisman of Time and Middle Class Law, 31 FAM. L.Q. 93
(1997). See also ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE
REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989); Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1559 (1991); and JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER (2000) (describing an "ideal worker"
who has the support of a homemaker spouse).
SNOCK, supra note 18, at 16.
47Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Divorce and the Division of Labor, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE:
A LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH (Dnes and Rowthom, eds., available at http://www.uiowa.-edu/-mnfblaw/).
" The National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) was first administered in 1987-88 and
included personal interviews with 13,007 respondents from a national sample. The sample includes a main
cross-section of 9,637 households plus an oversampling of blacks, Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans,
single-parent families, families with step-children, cohabiting couples and recently married persons. One adult
per household was randomly selected as the primary respondent. Several portions of the main interview were
self-administered to facilitate the collection of sensitive information and to ease the flow of the interview. The
average interview lasted one hour and forty minutes. In addition, a shorter self-administered questionnaire was
given to the spouse or cohabiting partner of the primary respondent. Brinig and Nock use identical questions
asked of the primary respondent and his or her spouse. The NSFH was administered by the Center for
Demography and Ecology of the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Brinig and Nock held constant almost all
known predictors of divorce (age at first marriage, education, income, race, etc.). They found that the divorce
and separation rate at the time and for the state where the respondent was living at the age of 16, are all
significant predictors of divorce. An increase in divorce and separation percents increase the odds of divorce,
while an increase in the percent who never married lowers the odds of divorce.
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of household and labor force tasks as fair.49 The coefficients in Table 3 hold
constant other factors that might influence marital stability (numbers of children,
whether their parents divorced, whether they cohabited, income, education and
so forth). At any combination of values for paid work (e.g., the first block of nine
cells) agreement by both partners that the arrangement is unfair to the other
person produces the best outcomes (i.e., lowest risk of disruption). For example,
when both partners feel that paid work is unfair to themselves (the first nine-cell
block in the table), the risks of disruption range from 4.43 to .72. The higher risk
obtains when partners each feel household tasks are unfair to themselves. The
lower value obtains when both feel such tasks are unfair to their partner.
The point is that for these couples, reporting in the late 1980s and staying
together or divorcing in the early 1990s, it was not even division, but either a lack
of concern of what each put in on household tasks or an acknowledgement that
the wife was doing too much that made the marriages more stable. Those who in
1987-88 looked short term and expected equal treatment were more likely to
experience marital failure by 1992-93. In addition to our study, there is
considerable literature supporting this point.5°
Cohabiting partners thus have less commitment to each other than do
married spouses,5 and are more likely to think in terms of short-term rather than
long-term consequences. In fact, cohabitation is usually an exchange relationship,
which produces less satisfaction52 than one taking an "internal stance"53 central
to a meaningful interpersonal relationship. In marriage, a relationship centered
upon short-run gains signals instability. 4
Even the landmark cohabitation opinion, Marvin v. Marvin,55 noted that
"[1]est we be misunderstood, however, we take this occasion to point out that the
structure of society itself largely depends upon the institution of marriage, and
nothing we have said in this opinion should be taken to derogate from that
institution."56 As a community, we in effect don't give the relationship trust,57 so
why treat it as though we do? Brinig and Nock, in their recent work, have found
that where young people grow up in areas where there is a higher percentage of
" Brinig & Nock, supra note 47.
50 For an analysis of what wives and husbands perceive as "fair," see Herbert L. Smith et al., Identifying
Underlying Dimensions in Spouses'Evaluations ofFairness in the Division of Household Labor, 27 Soc. SCl.
REs. 305 (1998).
"Nock, supra note 18, at 53.
52 Hansen, supra note 28.
53 MILTON C. REGAN, ALONE TOGETHER: LOVE AND THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE 24 (1999).
For an empirical investigation of this point, see Brinig & Nock, supra note 47; Nock, supra note 18.
" 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
56 Id. at 122.
17 Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, "I Only Want Trust," paper presented at the American
Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting, San Francisco, January, 2001, available at http://www.uiowa.-
edu/-mfblaw (describing trust from the community as central to good relationships).
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divorced people, the males delay first marriages.58 In other words, one of the
effects of a relatively high divorce rate seems to be a higher rate of cohabitation.
We know from other work that, surprisingly, marriages entered into after
cohabitation are less, not more stable, than those of couples who do not cohabit
first.' 9
As an interesting corollary, consider the fact that African-American women
are currently less likely to marry,6" and more likely to cohabit and to divorce,6
than white women. These minority women, regardless of strength of religious
preference, are the ones most likely to opt into covenant marriage in Louisiana.62
5 Id., Table 4. For an indication that this greater selectivity in marriage may be the reason for the decline
in the divorce rate since 1991, see St~phane M6choulan, Department of Economics, Northwestern University,
2000, "Divorce Laws and the Structure of the American Family," paper presented at the American Law and
Economics Association Annual Meeting, May 7, 2000.
" William G. Axinn & Arland Thornton, The Transformation in the Meaning of Marriage, in THE TIES
THAT BIND 147, 161 (Linda J. Waite, ed., 2000) (citing Bumpass & Sweet, supra note 13). There is no necessary
contradiction between a lower divorce rate (because of current cohabitation) and the higher tendency of first
marriages to dissolve where there has been prior cohabitation because of the delay between marriage and
divorce. Using life history data from the British Household Panel Study, John Ermisch and Marco Francesconi
estimate that about three in five cohabitations turn into marriage and 35 percent dissolve within ten years.
Cohabitation in Great Britain: Notfor Long, But Here to Stay, JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY,
Series A, vol. 163, Part 2, 153-172 (2000). For Britain, Kathleen Kiernam has estimated that 8 percent of
couples who get married before their first child is born split up within five years of the child's birth. The figure
is 25 percent for cohabiting couples who marry aftertheirbaby is born, Kathleen Kiernan, Childbearing Outside
Marriage in Western Europe, 98 POPULATION TRENDS 11, 19 & Table 11 (Winter 1999), and 52 percent for
those cohabiting couples who never marry. Without children, if couples cohabit instead of "marrying directly,"
they are 10.5 times more likely to experience dissolution. Kathleen Kiernan, Cohabitation in Western Europe,
96 POPULATION TRENDS 25, 30 & Table 7 (Summer 1999). Only slightly more than 20 percent of cohabiting
partnerships survive ten years. Note that because of the difference in time periods measured, the childless and
childbearing couples cannot be compared directly.
Generally speaking, the presence of a child increases union stability. See, e.g. Brinig & Nock, supra note
47 at 12 & Table 4 (more than 50% lower risk of disruption). See also Larry Bumpass, Teresa Castro and James
Sweet, Background and Early Marital Factors in Marital Disruption, MADISON CENTER FOR DEMOGRAPHY
AND ECOLOGY, 1990; Paul C. Glick and Arthur Norton, Marrying, Divorcing, and Living Together in the U.S.
Today, 32 POPULATION BULL. 1 (1977); Aphra R. Katzev, Rebecca L. Warner and Alan C. Acock, Girls or
Boys? Relationship of Child Gender to Marital Instability, 56 J. MARR. & FAMILY 89 (1994); Lee H. Lillard
& Linda J. Waite, A Joint Model of Marital Childbearing and Marital Dissolution, 30 DEMOGRAPHY 653
(1993); Linda J. Waite and Lee A. Lillard, Children and Marital Disruption, 96 AM. J. SOC. 930 (1991). For
discussions of statistics in Scandinavian countries, see Ann-Zofie E. Duvander, The Transition From
Cohabitation to Marriage: A Longitudinal Study of the Propensity to Marry in Sweden in the Early 1990s, 20
J. FAM. ISSUES 698 (1999); Ann Klimas Blanc, The Formation and Dissolution of Second Unions: Marriage
and Cohabitation in Sweden and Norway, 49 J. MARR. & FAM. 391 (1987). The breakup rate for Swedish
cohabitants with a child, according to Kiernan, RelationshipXX (Table 11) is four times higher than for married
Swedes. For an international survey, see PATRICIA MORGAN, Marriage-Lite: The Rise of Cohabitation and its
Consequences, LONDON INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CIViL SOCIETY (2000).
0 See, e.g., R. Kelly Raley, Recent Trends and Differentials in Marriage and Cohabitation: The United
States, THE TIES THAT BIND 19, 24 (Linda J. Waite ed., 2000).
61 M. Belinda Tucker, Marital Values and Expectations in Context: Results from a 21-City Survey, in
THE TIES THAT BIND 166, 182-83 (Linda J. Waite, ed., 2000).
62 See report of Steven L. Nock, in CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO
FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, AND PERSPECTIVES 125 (2d ed., 2000). Covenant marriage is authorized
by LA. Civ. CODE Art. 9, §§ 102 et seq. (1997) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 25-901 et seq. (1998). These regimes
are described in Margaret Brinig & Steven Nock, Covenant and Contract, 12 REGENT U. L. REv. 9, 10-11
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One might well hypothesize that because African-Americans value marriage as
much as do others,63 those who seek covenant marriage are looking for a lasting
relationship and think that more stringent divorce rules (or more required
counseling) will enhance their chances.
In sum, by using a default rule that is not what people would most likely
agree to in advance, we force those who do not want this type of relationship into
contract-mode, which is hard on the relationship (forcing over-planning) 64 and
destroys "covenantal" thinking as the parties focus on what they can get out of
the venture65 and how long it will last.66 As those of us who read family law cases
know, couples in committed relationships are unlikely to choose contracting.67
Default rules usually work best when parties are in the middle of making
contracts anyway,68 but the Principles' rules ripen only at some specified time
(1999).
63 Tucker, supra note 61, at 175. See generally Wendy D. Manning & Pamela J. Smock, Why Marry?
Race Relations and Transition to MarriageAmong Cohabitors, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 509 (1995); Michael J. Brien
& Lee A. Lillard, Interrelated Family-Building Behaviors: Cohabitation, Marriage, and NonMarital
Conception, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 535 (1999).
' For an example of over-planning, see the Peter and Susan contract from Lenore J. Weitzman, Legal
Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1169,1281 (1974), reproduced in SCHNEIDER
& BRINIG, supra note 62, at 377. For a discussion of related dysfunctions of contract as used in family law, see
id. at 459-60, 464, 467-68.
6 People in covenant relationships love unconditionally-that is, they have no expectation of an
immediate, tit-for-tat reward, and may never expect a financial award. For examples of my writing on
unconditional love, see BRINIG, supra note 16, at 83-84; and Brinig & Nock, supra note 62, at 15-19
(unconditional love in the Biblical and family contexts). The Biblical parallel is to God's generosity even when
what we are given, or what we accomplish in return, may not be equal. See, e.g., Matt. 20:1-16 (laborers in the
vineyard all were paid the daily wage, even though they began at different times); see also Janet Moore,
Covenant and Feminist Reconstructions of Subjectivity Within Theories of Justice, 55 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 159, 172 (Summer 1992) (citing Jon D. Levenson, Covenant and Commandment, 21 TRADITION 42,
50 (1983) (discussing the Hebrew view of covenant between God and Israel, as expressed in the book of
Joshua)).
As we report elsewhere, some couples who were asked to estimate how many hours they and their spouse
spent on a variety of household tasks during the last week did not answer the questions. These marriages were
more stable than those who did answer them, holding all else constant, and more stable than those who reported
that the division of household and labor force tasks were "about equal." Brinig & Nock, supra note 57, text at
n.52.
66 People who contract covenant relationships do so with the idea that they are permanent. They are
designed to last for the joint lifetimes of the parties, and to be intergenerational. For examples of my writing on
permanence, see BRINIG, supra note 16, at 194-96 (permanence in marriage); Brinig & Nock, supra note 62,
at 19-21 (permanence in the Biblical and family covenants); and Margaret F. Brinig, The Family Franchise:
Elderly Parents andAdult Siblings, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 393 (discussing how the concept of permanence works
in a society that allows divorce and emancipates children).
67 Some data from surveys of same-sex couples (who have very high incentives to contract) reveals that
as of 1995, 10 percent or less had written agreements. The Advocate Survey (1994-95). Data for married couples
is nearly impossible to obtain, since it will not be filed anywhere unless the marriage dissolves. By definition,
then, we cannot know how often American couples write antenuptial contracts. An article written in 1988
suggests that there are "more" such agreements than previously. Sheryl Nance, 'Til Some Breach Doth Them
Part, NAT'L. J., Nov. 7, 1988 at 1.
6 Most of the default provisions of the ALl PRINCIPLES, such as the custody principle discussed in
footnote 1, take conscious effect when the parents are bargaining at the time of divorce. However, the ALl
domestic partnership rules can take effect when the parties probably are not even thinking of contract-they
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after the couple's relationship begins. While arguably couples at the time they
marry aren't thinking in contract-mode,69 it is even less likely that they will be
doing so some years down the line when the state-defined "cohabitation period"7°
or "cohabitation parenting period" 1 completes, and their relationship ripens from
mere cohabitation into "domestic partnership."7
At the same time the Principles may do more for couples who are not
interested in being protected or protect some that might better be left on their
own, the Principles "undershoot" by doing too little for couples who may need
more support.73 By giving less protection to the relationship in terms of third
ripen or vest after some period of time when the cohabitors are in the midst of their relationship. Even where
the regime is quite harsh and its effects are well known, cohabiting parties frequently do not bargain at the time
they enter relationships. For examples, see the statistics on same-sex relationships citedsupra note 42, and those
on contracting around civil law community property regimes in Quebec before 1970, found in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAws, Family Law, Canada § 373, at 136-137 (1998) (even though prenuptial agreements
are more common in Quebec than elsewhere in Canada, they are only executed by the wealthy as of 1989,
because statutes now disallow contracting out of the "family patrimony," which is divided equally, and separate
property (formerly the regime of choice) is now the default. Id. at §§ 284-285, at 112-13).
69 Nor do they understand the legal regimes of marriage and divorce, nor the likelihood that their own
marriage will falter. Lynn A. Baker & Robert Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions
and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEH. 439 (1993).
70 ALI PRINCIPLES § 6.03(3) provides that persons are "presumed to be domestic partners when they have
maintained a common household ... for a continuous period that equals or exceeds a duration, called the
cohabitation period, set in a uniform rule of statewide application" (emphasis in original).
11 ALl PRINCIPLES § 6.03(2) provides that "[p]ersons are domestic partners when they have maintained
a common household.., with their common child.., for a continuous period that equals or exceeds a duration,
called the cohabitation parentingperiod, set in a uniform rule of statewide application" (emphasis in original).
72 Similar problems of proof plague persons attempting to establish common law marriage, since the
requisite agreement to be married "in words of the present tense" must have existed before the parties cohabit
and "hold themselves out" as married to the community. See, e.g., Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505, 510
(Iowa 1979). Many times couples will move in together gradually, and will not form an intent either to set up
a domestic partnership or to be married at common law until a later time. Such problems of intent are considered
in Shrader v. Shrader, 484 P.2d 1007 (Kan. 1971) (describing woman who did not want to "absolutely remarry"
after couple got divorce of first marriage); Conklin v. Conklin, 557 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (ruling
no common law marriage, although parties had been married at one time and cohabited together for several
years before the man's death, where they did not consistently claim to be married); and Goldin v. Goldin, 426
A.2d 410 (Md. App. 1981) (finding Catholic religious beliefs impeded second ceremonial or common law
marriage although the couple cohabited in Pennsylvania on weekends). Iowa may have solved some of them by
providing for recording of common law marriages. Iowa Code Ann. § 595.11 provides:
Marriages solemnized, with the consent of parties, in any manner other than that prescribed in this
chapter, are valid; but the parties, and all persons aiding or abetting them, shall pay to the treasurer
of state for deposit in the general fund of the state the sum of fifty dollars each; but this shall not
apply to the person conducting the marriage ceremony, if within fifteen days after the ceremony
is conducted, the person makes the required return to the county registrar.
" The support and recognition of the community are vital for maintaining vibrant marriages. See
Margaret F. Brinig, Community Involvement and Its Limits in Marriages and Families, in MARRIAGE IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Alan J. Hawkins & Lynn D. Wardle, eds., Greenwood Press, forthcoming 2001).
Community support not only strengthens families, it also helps the individual. For empirical results, see Brinig
& Nock, I Only Want Trust, supra note 57, at table 2 (divorced, noncustodial fathers are more depressed than
divorced fathers or divorced men in general, even holding constant income and prior depression). For a
theoretical discussion, see REGAN, supra note 21, at 77-102.
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party recognition,74 the couple is less free to promote intimacy" than is the
married couple, whether married ceremonially or by common law.76 There is no
requirement that during the relationship partners support one another or provide
" This would include income and gift-tax relief, the marital communications privilege, interspousal tort
immunity, the "necessaries" or "family expense" doctrine, intestate succession, tenancy by the entireties and
other "family homestead" protections. For a description of these communications practices, see REGAN, supra
note 53, at 89-139 (marital testimonial communications), 31 (interspousal immunity), 202-03 (necessaries).
" As I explained in Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, 794 CoRNELL L. REV. 1573
(1994), and as Milton Regan points out in REGAN, supra note 21, at 77, 83, 96, status offers an opportunity for
happiness because it restrains the "free play of subjectivity." The definition of roles that status provides
therefore does not fetter, but rather frees us. See Brinig, supra, at 1587. 1 cited to St. Paul's passage in Galatians
5:1, that by being in bondage to Christ, the Christian finds the greatest liberty "Stand Fast therefore in the liberty
wherewith Christ has made us free, and be not entangled with the Yoke of bondage." Id. n.82.
76 This point is also made by Nock, supra note 18. Nock finds that the felt obligation to or imagined
commitment of the spouse is the strongest influence on individual commitment to marriage. Id. at 513.
Economists refer to financial, time and labor commitments of this sort to the marriage enterprise as
"marriage-specific capital." BECKER, supra note 5, at 325-30. On the other side of the story, Nock explains that
"were an individual to perceive absolutely no costs to terminating a relationship, we could describe that person
as having virtually no commitment to it." Nock, supra note 19, at 505. Thus, cohabiting partners demonstrate
less commitment and their relationships become less stable. Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and
Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J. FAM. IssuEs 53 (1995).
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medical care." They do not enjoy the privileges of confidential communications"8
or tort immunities.79 They cannot hold property as a community8° or by the
" This objection seems to be met, at least at a minimal level, by California's domestic partnership
provisions, which apply to same-sex couples and to persons over 62 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (2000), allows
registration of domestic partnerships in which partners must agree to assumej oint responsibility for each other's
"basic living expenses," authorizes state and local employers to offer health care coverage and other benefits
to domestic partners of employees, and requires health-care facilities to permit visits by a patient's domestic
partner. See also MODERNIZATION OF BENEFITS AND OBLIGATIONS ACT, R.S.C., Ch.C-23 (2000) (Can.)
(amending CRIMINAL CODE § 215(l)(b) to punish those who fail to provide necessaries to a common law
partner). Denmark (through the DANISH REGISTERED PARTNERSHp ACT, 1989), Norway (in the Norwegian
Registered Partnership Act of 1991), Sweden (1995), and Iceland (1996), all have registered same-sex
partnerships, which recognize almost all of the consequences of marriage. See generally Sanford N. Katz,
Emerging ModelsforAlternatives to Marriage, 33 FAM. L.Q. 663 (1999). In People v. Delph, 156 CAL. RPTR.
422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). The marital communication privilege was held to be inapplicable to nonmarried
cohabitants. The privilege fosters the marital relationship by encouraging spouses to share their intimate
thoughts and secrets, thus adding intimacy and support to the marriage. See generally GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN
INTRODUCTION To THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 94, 447-51 (2000); see also Steven N. Gofman, Note, "Honey,
The Judge Says We're History": Abrogating the Marital Privileges Via Modern Doctrines of Marital
Worthiness, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 843,848 n.26 (1992) (stating that "marital privileges evolved because courts
and legislatures, by implication, determined that protecting the harmony of legal marital unions was more
important than truth-seeking at trial") (footnote omitted). Note, Kristina K. Pappa, Privileged Communcations,
25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1591 & n.12 (1995). Following Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, unmarried cohabitants have
brought claims in wrongful death, inheritance rights, the marital communication privilege, the effect of
cohabitation on the termination of spousal support, and other areas. See Comment, The Property Rights of
Unmarried Cohabitants-A Proposal, 14 CAL. W. L. REV. 485, 498-99 (1979).
THE Al PRINCIPLES apply to family dissolution, not ongoing relationships. State laws presumably govern
ongoing relationships. State laws limit requirements of support to married couples or parents of minor children.
For example, 750 ILL. COMp. STAT. 15/1 provides in § I that:
Every person who shall, without any lawful excuse, neglect or refuse to provide for the support
or maintenance of his or her spouse, said spouse being in need of such support or maintenance,
or any person who shall, without lawful excuse, desert or neglect or refuse to provide for the
support or maintenance of his or her child or children under the age of 18 years, in need of such
support or maintenance, shall be deemed guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and shall be liable
under the provisions of the Illinois Public Aid Code.
78 For a lengthy discussion of these principles see REGAN, supra note 53. See also Milton C. Regan,
Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REv. 2045 (1995) (setting forth distinctions
between the confidential communication privilege and the adverse testimony privilege, and giving many
citations).
" The immunity does work, if allowed by statute, during voidable marriages. See Gordon v. Pollard, 336
S.W.2d 25 (Tenn. 1960) (abrogating the immunity in Tennessee because marriage had been previously annulled
with decree stating it was "void ab initio" (Tennessee later abrogated the immunity).
8 See Western State Constr. Co., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Nev. 1992) (Springer, KJ.,
dissenting); cf Lindemann v. Lindemann, 960 P.2d 966 (Wash. 1998) (holding that parties who cohabit
knowing they are not married may hold property as though it were community property, even though in the
absence of marriage there is by definition no community property. The opinion states "[u]pon dissolution of a
marriage, all separate and community property is before the court for distribution. A different rule applies upon
the break-up of a quasi-marital relationship. To avoid equating cohabitation with marriage, the Supreme Court
held in Connell that a court may distribute only the property that the cohabiting couple has acquired through
efforts extended during the relationship.") (footnote omitted); Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923, 929 (Ariz. 1986)
("This Court recognizes that community property rights derive solely from the marital relationship... and the
law will not give non-marital cohabiting parties the benefit of community property"). See generally Katz, supra
note 77, at 666-67 (citing Sanford N. Katz, Marriage as Partnership, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1263-68
(1998)).
[2002] DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP: MISSING THE TARGET?
entireties." If one of them dies, the other does not have the benefit of intestacy82
laws, as would a putative spouse.83 Supporting children does not become a
common enterprise because of the adults' relationship. In short, the Principles
apply only in cases of dissolution.85 Heterosexual couples who want or intend to
be married, and their children, are better protected by marriage, common law
marriage,86 the putative spouse doctrine, and other common law remedies.
" See, e.g., Beaton v. LaFord, 261 N.W.2d 327 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (cohabiting couple who purported
to take as tenants by the entireties took as joint tenants).
82 See, e.g., Peffley-Wamer v. Bowen, 778 P.2d 1022 (Wash. 1989) (surviving cohabitant couple not
entitled to widow's benefit under Social Security); Cassano v. Durham, 436 A.2d 118 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1981) (plaintiff was not a "surviving spouse" within meaning of intestacy statute, and thus, she could not
recover under Wrongful Death Act).
83 See, e.g., Estate of Hafner, 229 CAL. RPTR. 676 (Cal. App. 1986) (putative spouse received half the
estate as quasi-marital property); Estate ofAtherley, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Cal. App. 1975) (putative spouse entitled
to one-half of all property, acquired during "marriage," and to all property owned jointly and separately);
Mjolsness v. Mjolsness, 363 N.W.2d 839 (Minn. 1985) (surviving former husband was not a putative spouse
who could take against deceased former wife's estate). Putative marriages are recognized in some former civil
law jurisdictions and under § 209 of the UMDA. See Comments to ALl PRINCIPLES § 6.01, at 9.
' What I mean by this is the following. If a couple marries, the stepparent may well have support
obligations for the children of the spouse at least during the pendency of the relationship. See, e.g., WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.16.205:
The expenses of the family and the education of the children, including stepchildren, are
chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them, and they may be sued
jointly or separately. When a petition for dissolution of marriage or a petition for legal separation
is filed, the court may, upon motion of the stepparent, terminate the obligation to support the
stepchildren. The obligation to support stepchildren shall cease upon the entry of a decree of
dissolution, decree of legal separation, or death.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09 provides:
a. Liability of stepparent for support. A stepparent is not bound to maintain the spouse's
dependent children, as defined in section 50-09-01, unless the child is received into the
stepparent's family. If the stepparent receives them into the family, the stepparent is liable, to the
extent of his or her ability, to support them during the marriage and so long thereafter as they
remain in the stepparent's family.
But see Wood v. Woods, 184 CAL. RPTR. 471 (Cal. App. 1982) (not requiring that stepparent repay county for
AFDC) (Whether this lasts beyond dissolution depends, under the Principles, upon whether the stepparent has
become a de facto parent or parent by estoppel.). Compare Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 2000)
(parent liable under doctrine of equitable adoption); with Bagwell v. Bagwell, 698 So.2d 746 (La. Ct. App.
1997) (no obligation after divorce). But no such obligation exists for the child of a cohabitant.
85 The ALl PRINCIPLES, § 6.01 (1) provides that "[t]his Chapter governs the financial claims of domestic
partners against one another at the termination oftheir relationship." (emphasis added). As Comment a to § 6.02
provides: "Nor are domestic relationships likely to provide a satisfactory alternative to marriage for those
otherwise inclined to marry, for informal domestic relationships are not generally recognized by third parties,
including governments, which often make marriage advantageous under various regulatory and benefit
schemes."
"See, e.g., Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171 (Utah Ct. 2000). As the Comments to ALI PRINCIPLES § 6.01,
at 2, reasons, in terms of legal incidents, there is no distinction between a lawful common-law marriage and a
lawful ceremonial marriage. "Marriage creates a legal status that encompasses not only inter se rights and
responsibilities of the spouses, but also rights and responsibilities of the spouses in relation to third parties and
the state." Comment to §6.01 at 2 (emphasis in original). Comment (a) to the ALl PRINCIPLES, § 6.03 at 39
states that the District of Columbia and 11 states currently recognize common law marriage.
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Now let's look at some famous cases to see how they'd be dealt with by the
ALl. The most notable of all, of course, is Marvin v. Marvin.87 The Marvins could
not be married at common law because common law marriages were abolished
in California.88 Further, Lee Marvin was still married to Betty at the time he
allegedly contracted with Michelle.89 They did not qualify as putative spouses
because neither had a good faith belief that they were married. Ultimately, on
remand,9 ° Michelle could prove neither an express contract nor unjust enrich-
ment, so she was given no monetary award.9' Would she recover under the ALI
Principles? Apparently so. Their facts are Example 6 to paragraph (3)92 which
states that persons not related by blood or adoption are presumed to be domestic
partners when they have "maintained a common household," as the Marvins
clearly did, for a continuous period called the cohabitation period, which their six
year cohabitation period would probably satisfy.93 The presumption is rebuttable
by evidence that the parties did not share or live together as a couple.94 Most
students of family law have read at least one of the Marvin opinions, in which
they might well conclude, as the Court of Appeals did on remand, that Michelle
had lived well while the relationship lasted, that Lee had done quite a bit to
further her singing career, and that he had gone to some lengths not to marry her,
so she was entitled to nothing more. The Principles, on the other hand, would
apparently let her share the million or so dollars Lee earned during those six years
under Chapter 4.
8' 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
I8 1d. at 117 n.ll.89 Id. at 111. As with any other marriage, a person cannot enter into a common law marriage with another
marriage still existing. For an attempted bigamous common law marriage, see Kasey v. Richardson, 331 F.
Supp. 580 (W.D. Va. 1971) (holding that void marriage still enough to qualify a child as legal for Social
Security dependent benefits).
9o 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Cal. App. 1981).
9' Id. at 557, 559.
92 Illustration (6) of ALI PRINCIPLES § 6.03, at 25.
93 For example, The ONTAiuo FAMILY LAW REFORM ACT of 1986, §§ 29 and 30, requires "continuous
cohabitation for not less than five years." The British Columbia support statute requires "a marriage-like
relationship for a period of at least 2 years .... "
94 Paragraph (7) of ALI PRINCIPLES § 6.03 lists a number of factors for rebutting the presumption. Lee
Marvin could point to absence of the following factors to support lack of "life together as a couple": (a)
statements made to third parties about their relationship, (b) the extent to which they commingled finances, (e)
the extent to which the relationship wrought change in the life of either, (f) the extent to which acknowledged
responsibility to one another by making beneficiaries, (j) participation in a commitment ceremony, (1) no
children.
[2002] DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP: MISSING THE TARGET? 33
In contrast, the ALI result of the fact pattern in Hewitt v. Hewitt95 probably
would be more appealing than the one actually reached by the Illinois court,96 but
demonstrates "undershooting," since Ms. Hewitt would have received more
complete relief under a tort claim for fraud and deceit rather than a contract
action.97 Of course, what she might claim would not be so much the result of hurt
9' 394 N.E.2d 1204 (111. 1979). Hewitt is apparently Illustration 3 to § 6.03, at 23-24, which notes that
the couple meets the requirements of Paragraph 2 that "they have maintained a common household. . . with
their common child ... for a continuous period that equals or exceeds a duration, called the cohabitation
parenting period" (emphasis in original). They had lived together for 15 years, satisfying any reasonable time
period. Victoria allegedly thought they were married once she became pregnant and Robert convinced her that
they were already married. She supported him while he pursued an advanced degree and established a successful
practice as a podiatrist. The opinion notes that outwardly they maintained a very conventional lifestyle. For her
not to recover "an equal share of the profits and properties accumulated by the parties" seems unjust under a
fraud and deceit theory as well. Presumably, if she had known that they were not married, Victoria would have
insisted on a ceremonial marriage and thus would not have had legal difficulties. If she had insisted on the
ceremony and Robert had been deceptive, getting an unlicensed person to perform the ceremony, she would
have been able to recover under the putative spouse doctrine.
9 The opinion found that she was not common law married (because common law marriages have been
abolished in Illinois since 1905), that she did not qualify as a putative spouse because she had not gone through
a ceremony, not for a contract relief because of the illegality of the parties' relationship. See also Thomas v.
LaRosa, 400 S.E.2d 809, 814 (W. Va. 1990). The opinion has not been extended in Illinois. Crawford v. City
of Chicago, 710 N.E.2d 91, 100 (111. App. Ct. 1999), noted that as indicated by the very language plaintiffs cite
from Hewitt and Jarrett, whether non-married individuals have the same rights as married individuals is an
issue for the Legislature to determine. The General Assembly has never legislated on the question whether
same-sex, cohabiting individuals may purchase the same health insurance as married individuals. There is no
public policy prohibiting the exercise of home-rule authority in this area. Fornication that is "open and
notorious" continues to be a misdemeanor under 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-8, though no-fault divorce was
enacted in Illinois in 1983, S.189, P.A. 83-954, effective July 1, 1984.
97 In Alexander v. Kuykendall, 63 S.E.2d 746 (Va. 1951), the woman worked as supervisor in the Norfolk
Navy Yard. The man convinced her to marry him and move to northern Virginia. She quit herjob, went through
a ceremony, moved to northern Virginia, and lived with him as his wife, bearing his child. When she discovered
that the entire time he had had an existing marriage, she sought recovery in contract for the value ofher services,
and in tort for humiliation and embarrassment. She could recover under tort only, because her services were
performed as his wife, not for hire. Cooper v. Spencer, 238 S.E.2d 805 (Va. 1977), provides an example of a
couple who lived together for many years thinking they were validly married when in fact neither of their
divorces from prior marriages was finalized before their ceremony. The "wife" could not recover a share of the
farm assets titled in his name as a partner, because there were no written partnership documents. The wife could
not recover under implied contract, because she believed herself married and therefore acted out of love and
affection, rather than the hope of pecuniary gain. In Lampus v. Lampus, 660 A.2d 1308 (Pa. 1995), the man,
knowing that his prior divorce had been declared invalid, nevertheless, entered into another marriage. Upon his
death, the woman discovered that her marriage had been bigamous and asserted claims for breach of promise
to marry, and for deceit, negligent misrepresentation, concealment, and negligence. The court upheld the lower
court's dismissal of the breach of promise to many claim, but allowed the woman to maintain the remaining
counts. In Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995), the man was also already married when he promised
to marry the woman. He did not tell her of his married status. Nevertheless, he participated with her in planning
the wedding and obtaining a marriage license, but on the morning of the wedding told her he would not marry
her, but he still did not tell her that he was already married. She sued him for breach of promise to marry and
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Utah, there was no statute prohibiting breach of promise suits.
The court then, in essence, abolished the cause of action but preserved what could be termed a right to maintain
palimony actions--"losses... may be recoverable under a theory of reasonable reliance or breach of contract."
Id. at 687. The court permitted the maintenance of an actionfor intentional infliction of emotional distress
because the man knew he was already married, and thus could not marry the woman when he proposed to her,
obtained the marriage license, and planned the wedding. These actions, the Utah court held, might be
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feelings or embarrassment as the lack of equity in allowing Robert to profit from
her investments in his career, and from parenting their children.98 So the domestic
partnership provisions would at least give Victoria Hewitt partial relief, though
perhaps less than what would be granted to Michelle Marvin.99
In Miller v. Ratner,'° a woman moved in with one of the co-owners of the
"Hair Cuttery" chain with the expectation, shared by her friends, that they would
shortly be married.' °' He literally threw her out of the residence some time later
after she was diagnosed with breast cancer and had a mastectomy performed. She
sued in tort as well as for the value of her services performed during the three
years they lived together. Lonnie Miller thought the couple was to marry, and
therefore would continue to fall under the bans of the heartbalm legislation0 2 as
sufficiently "'outrageous and intolerable in that they offend... generally accepted standards of decency and
morality."' Id. at 688 (quoting Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (Utah 1961)).
9' Another possibility for her would have been possible in Texas, where at least one case allows recovery
as a putative spouse even after an attempted common law marriage. Hupp v. Hupp, 235 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950). Arguably the two situations are distinguishable, though, since Texas, unlike Illinois, does recognize
common law marriage. The problem the Hewitts had is that they were able to marry, but did not.
9 The difference in the recoveries in the two cases comes from the difference in the types of investment
the two women made. Lee earned a tremendous sum of money during the relationship. Robert Hewitt's earnings,
while considerable, are more valuable only as they accumulate over his career. Michelle's claim as a
household-service provider comes from the "backup" support she provided to the career Lee already had as an
actor at the time they met. It is therefore based upon his future earnings, and the assets they purchased, both
clearly recoverable under Chapter 6. Victoria's claim, as she supported his acquisition of a degree (clearly held
in Robert's name) and nurtured their children, is less straightforward. While Victoria might claim some share
of his future earnings as "compensatory payments" under § 6.06, it is difficult to see, since she worked
throughout the marriage "with her own special skills" and deposited payroll checks in a common fund, that she
has suffered the type of "loss of living standard," needed under § 5.03, with Robert accumulating "large
amounts of property," some of which was owned separately. She would also need to prove under § 5.16 that the
relationship dissolved before she realized a fair return from her investment in Robert's earning capacity. She
may be able to claim that their period together justified an award under §5.05(1) (significant difference in
wealth or earning capacity). But see the cautionary comments to this section on the value of homemaker services
(contribution as opposed to loss), ALl PRINCIPLES at 303-04. In other words, while she might well have a
property distribution claim under Chapter 4 to a portion of the "large amounts of property" accumulated during
the relationship, she may well lose out on future wealth that in the long run is more significant. A damage award
under a tort claim might well give her more money.
Had the relationship stayed together until Robert's death, Victoria would clearly do better under the tort
treatment since Chapter 6 only compensates at dissolution. While the recovery would be in tort, the damages
would be similar to what she'd receive as a putative spouse.
0 688 A.2d 976 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997).
,0, The court, citing appellant's brief, termed this a "permanent commitment that would be followed by
marriage." Id. at 987.
'
02 MD. CODE ANN. [Fam. Law] § 3-102.
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far as any tort was concerned. 10 3 The couple also stayed together for a period too
brief to qualify under most state "cohabitation periods."
Nor would the result change in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,1 °4 since parenting
is not governed by Chapter 6 of the Principles, but instead by Chapter 2.105
Though Michael and Carole, the married woman in question, did live together
and together had a child, and although Chapter 6 would not rule out "domestic
partnerships" to those with still-valid marriages to others, presumably the period
of time during which Michael and Carole lived together (a total of eleven months)
would be too short. But Michael's knowledge that Carole was married to another
would not have barred the acquisition of rights to a share in her accumulated
property 1 6 if they had shared a "primary residence."'0 7
So, results would change in some cases (and would give Michelle Marvin
more than many of us would think she deserved), but many other people with just
claims would go under- or uncompensated. The ALl thus misses the target most
of us would envision. The broader policy argument is that people who can marry
ought to be encouraged to do so, for the increase in what those relationships can
accomplish, for the sake of the stability of the relationships, and especially for the
sake of their children.
03 The Miller court distinguished the case from traditional "palimony" actions by noting:
The palimony cases that we have examined have one thing in common. They exist in a factual
prrcis that is completely free of any taint of a breach of promise to marry. So long as persons
initiate and maintain their relationships based upon promises of marriage, and its anticipation,
rights arising out of those promises or agreements cannot escape the bar by being recast as
agreements between nonmarital partners. That is not to say that if the agreement to marry is
terminated and the relationship either continues or recommences, as in Kozlowski, under a new
agreement, in which no promises to marry are made and which does not anticipate a marriage, that
a contractual action might not be sustainable. Moreover, while we do not so decide, it is not
difficult to surmise that breach of contract actions between nonmarital partners completely free
of promises in anticipation of marriage, might also be viable.
Id. at 992.
"o 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding, as a constitutional matter, California's irrebuttable presumption of
legitimacy of children born during a couple's marriage, unless objected to by one of the spouses).
"' ALl PRINCIPLES § 6.01(4) provides that "[c]laims for custodial and decisionmaking responsibilities,
and for child support, are governed by Chapters 2 and 3, and not by this Chapter."
",Comment (d) to Al PRINCIPLES § 6.01, at 8, provides that "[k]nowledge that one or both of the parties
are married to another person is not conceptually inconsistent with assertion of claims under this Chapter."
107 In fact, Michael lived with Carole and Victoria when "if he happened to be in Los Angeles, he stayed
with her and the child," Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124, though they "shared the same household," id. at 143-44,
and Michael "contributed to Victoria's support."
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Table 1. Relative risk of partnership dissolution according to type of first
partnership for women aged 20-39 years. Model 2 with controls for age at first
partnership
Country Model 1 Model 2
Sweden
Married directly 1 1
Cohabited-married 0.88 0.88
Cohabited 7.73*** 7.81 ***
Norway
Married directly 1 1
Cohabited-married 0.70 ** 0.71 **
Cohabited 8.23*** 8.69***
Finland




Married directly 1 1
Cohabited-married 1.2 1.15
Cohabited 2.27*** 2.01 **
Austria
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Married directly 1 1
Cohabited-married 1.52 1.48
Cohabited 19.1 ** 16.8***
Spain
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From Kathleen Kieman, Cohabitation in Western Europe, 96 POPULATION
TRENDS 25, 30 & Table 7 (Summer 1999). Data based on Eurobarometer Surveys
from 1996, typically several thousand respondents per country.
Table 2. Life-table estimates of percentage of unions surviving 3 and 5 years
after the birth of first child amongst women aged 20-45 years according to type
of first partnership.
Country % surviving % surviving Number in the
36 months 60 months risk set
Norway *
Married 97 94 1677
Cohabitation 87 82 456
cohabited/married 98 95 131
cohabited only 79 71 325
Sweden*
Married 96 93 817
Cohabitation 90 84 1424
cohabited/married 97 94 493
cohabited only 84 75 931
Austria
Married 97 94 2161
Cohabitation 92 86 670
cohabited/married 98 96 246
cohabited only 86 71 424
Switzerland
Married 97 95 2191
Cohabitation 82 73 166
cohabited/married 95 86 65
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cohabited only 64 53 101
West Germany**
Married 95 91 873
Cohabitation 92 85 161
cohabited/married 97 91 45
cohabited only 89 80 116
France
Married 92 86 1348
Cohabitation 82 73 594
cohabited/married 86 77 103
cohabited only 81 71 491
Great Britain
Married 96 92 1242
Cohabitation 71 57 149
cohabited/married 90 75 43
cohabited only 61 48 106
Italy
Married 99 98 2677
Cohabitation 95 91 90
cohabited/married - 31
cohabited only 93 82 59
Spain
Married 99 98 1540
Cohabitation 79 67 74
cohabited/married - - 16
[2002]
JOURNAL OF LAW & FAMILY STUDIES Vol. 4 No. 1
cohabited only 1 71 1 51 1 58
From Kathleen Kieman, Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western Europe, 98
POPULATION TRENDS, 11, 19 & Table 11 (Winter 1999). Data based on UN ECE
European Family and Fertility Surveys and British Household Panel Survey,
taken 1992-96.
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